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RESOLVING LAND-USE DISPUTES BY INTIMIDATION:
SLAPP SUITS IN NEW MEXICO
FREDERICK M. ROWE* & LEO M. ROMERO*
The ripple effect of such suits in our society is enormous. Persons who have
been outspoken on issues of public importance targeted in such suits or who
have witnessed such suits will often choose in thefuture to stay silent.Short of
a gun to the head, a greaterthreatto FirstAmendment expression can scarcely
be imagined.'

In April 2001, New Mexico joined seventeen other states2 by enacting legislation
to curtail SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) that target
citizens for exercising their rights to petition their government as guaranteed by the
First Amendment. The New Mexico Legislature recognized the importance of
protecting citizens' rights to petition their government and to participate in
proceedings before governmental tribunals and enacted procedures to mitigate the
financial burdens of defending against lawsuits based on citizen participation before
governmental bodies.3 At the same time, the new statute prevents the chilling effect
of SLAPP suits on both those sued as well as other citizens who might be deterred
from participating in issues of community concern because of fear of costly
litigation.
The statute addresses those legislative goals. Key provisions require early
determination of motions to dismiss SLAPP suits in order to avoid the expenses of
defending such a lawsuit. These provisions call for expedited consideration of
motions to dismiss SLAPP suits4 and for expedited appeals of rulings on these
motions.5 Another provision, designed to deter meritless lawsuits against citizens
who petition the government in the exercise of their First Amendment rights,
mandates the award of attorney fees to those who succeed on their motion to
dismiss.6 Consequently, filing lawsuits against people whose conduct is a legitimate

* Formerly chairman, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law; Adjunct Professor of Law,
Yale Management School; Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School, Harvard Law School, and University of California
(Berkeley) Law School. This co-author organized the New Mexico NoSLAPP Alliance, which pushed for passage
of anti-SLAPP legislation. Previously, he had been sued personally in a SLAPP suit filed by a developer against
the Greater Callecita Neighborhood Association, of which he also was an officer and director. Thereafter, he
became a co-plaintiff in the association's countersuit against the developer, the developer's lawyer, and two city
officials.
** Keleher & McLeod Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. This co-author is a
member and officer of the West Bluff Neighborhood Association, one of the associations involved in a land-use
dispute in the City of Albuquerque and sued by the developer in a SLAPP suit. This co-author also helped in the
lobbying effort leading to the enactment of the anti-SLAPP bill by the New Mexico Legislature in 2001.
Both authors wish to acknowledge Professor Ted Occhialino of the University of New Mexico School
of Law for his invaluable help with regard to New Mexico rules of procedure and his suggestions for improvement
of the article.
1. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649,656 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1992).
2. As of 2001, the following states had enacted statutes to control SLAPP suits: California, Minnesota,
Delaware, Nebraska, Florida, Nevada, Georgia, New York, Indiana, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Maine,
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Washington. See Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953,962 n.19 (Mass.
20
01) (listing states that have SLAPP statutes); Morse Bros. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842,846 (Me. 2001) (discussing
Maine statute); see also 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7707 (2000).
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (2001). The complete text of the statute is set forth in section II.A., infra.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001).
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(C) (2001).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001). The statute also authorizes courts to award attorney fees and
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petitioning of the government or exercise of free speech will no longer be without
cost. Under the new anti-SLAPP law, plaintiffs filing such lawsuits now risk having
to pay their targets' attorney fees.
The statute creates no new legal rights or defenses for those sued based on their
constitutionally protected petitioning or free speech activities. Nor does the statute
limit any rights to file actions against persons whose conduct strays outside the
constitutional protections. Rather, the new law provides procedures that allow
defendants who claim that lawsuits are based on protected conduct or speech to
obtain early rulings on motions to dismiss and reimbursement for their attorney fees
if they prevail.
This article outlines recent SLAPP litigation in New Mexico, summarizes the
new anti-SLAPP law, and highlights important legal issues posed by the statutory
text for land-use controversies.
I. SLAPP LITIGATION IN THE COURTS
A. What are SLAPP suits?
So-called SLAPP suits, the acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, were diagnosed and analyzed in a legal/sociological study by the
University of Denver, which examined 241 lawsuits nationwide that were brought
against people based on their conduct seeking to influence official action by
governments. This study produced a series of publications culminating in a
handbook that has become a bible for lawyers facing tough land-use disputes
involving citizen opposition.7
Consistent with the Denver study's conclusions, SLAPP litigation was profiled
by a recent California court's opinion:
The typical SLAPP suit involves citizens opposed to a particular real estate
development. The group opposed to the project, usually a local neighborhood,
protests by distributing flyers, writing letters to local newspapers, and speaking
at planning commission or city council meetings. The developer responds by
filing a SLAPP suit against the citizen group alleging defamation or various
business torts .... SLAPP plaintiffs do not intend to win their suits; rather, they
are filed solely for delay and distraction...and to punish activists by imposing
litigation costs on them for exercising their constitutional right to speak and
petition the government for redress of grievances. 8
As the California court stressed, SLAPPs differ from ordinary commercial
litigation in critical ways:
Because winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff's primary motivation, defendants'
traditional safeguards against meritless actions (suits for malicious prosecution
and abuse of process, requests for sanctions) are inadequate to counter SLAPPs.

costs to the party opposing the motion to dismiss if the motion to dismiss is frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay. Id.
7. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETItNG SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).

8. Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
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Instead, the SLAPPer considers any damage or sanction award which the
SLAPPee might eventually recover as merely a cost of doing business.'
The money calculus behind SLAPP suits to silence opposition by citizens to a
land-use project is simple: imposing or threatening large costs and attorney fees on
opponents in defending against the lawsuit and the possibility of having to pay a
substantial money judgment. For developers, hiring lawyers and financing such a
lawsuit is a tax-deductible business expense. But for victims of SLAPP suits,
typically neighborhood associations or private citizens, the high costs of defending
inflict heavy financial burdens' ° that may deter further opposition to the proposed
development. The neighborhood associations, already financially strapped by
fighting the development in forums such as zoning boards, planning agencies, or
courts, now must raise even more money to defend against this litigation. Unless
scarce pro bono counsel will represent them, they need funds to hire an attorney and
to cover litigation costs for depositions and experts. For citizens sued personally,
the risks are even higher since an adverse judgment can be satisfied from their
private assets. This risk, plus attorney fees and discovery costs, puts pressure on
people to quit their opposition to the developer's project. Furthermore, a highprofile SLAPP suit may not only "chill" and silence the immediate victim but also
becomes a smart long-term investment because it makes every victim an example
and a carrier who spreads the virus of fear throughout the community.
Of course, SLAPP suits do not come labeled as such. Rather, SLAPP complaints
may pick from a menu of tort, contract, defamation, or even civil rights conspiracy
causes of action in targeting neighborhood groups or citizens who stand in the way
of a developer's project. The crucial first step, therefore, is to spot such lawsuits as
SLAPPs-by focusing on the challenged activities of the target in relation to their
First Amendment protections, rather than treating the case as an ordinary
commercial or tort litigation. In short, the complaint's camouflage allegations must
be pierced to determine whether the plaintiff's grievance stems from activities by
the defendant that are designed to influence official action and are therefore
protected by the First Amendment.
B. Recent "Classic" SLAPP Suits in New Mexico
Two recent lawsuits in New Mexico illustrate the nature of SLAPP suits, their
use in intimidating citizen opposition in public forums to land development
projects, and the need for legislation to curtail their chilling effect on public
participation and the democratic process. One lawsuit was filed in Santa Fe in June
1998 and the other in Albuquerque in June 2000.

9. Id. "By the time a SLAPP victim can win a 'SLAPP-back' suit years later, the SLAPP plaintiff will
probably already have accomplished its underlying objective." Id.
10. For example, according to the individual defendants sued by the developer in the Albuquerque Wal-Mart
case, see Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed June 22,2000), attorney fees for the four
individually named defendants in representing them through the motion to dismiss totaled more than $100,000.
Fortunately for those individuals, their homeowner's insurance policies covered these expenses. The neighborhood
associations did not pay attorney fees because the New Mexico Civil Liberties Union represented them.
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1. The Santa Fe Los Vecinos Case
The widely publicized Los Vecinos SLAPP suit" arose from the successful
opposition by the Greater Callecita Neighborhood Association and many Santa Fe
citizens to a sixty-eight-acre development project on steep foothill slopes in
northern Santa Fe. The proposed Los Vecinos subdivision featured nearly sixty
large homes, plus an optional commercial tract. 2 This project was twice
disapproved by the Santa Fe City Council-in 1995 (eight to zero) and 1997 (five
to two)-largely due to drainage and flooding problems that contravened a special
protective ordinance that had rezoned this tract as a Planned Residential
Community.'.'
After failing to prevent the City Council's public hearing and then failing to set
aside the City Council's disapproval on the merits, the developer claimed bias,
prejudice, and unfairness due to alleged ex parte communications by neighbors with
city councilors and alleged collusion among several councilors to disapprove the
project prior to the council's public hearing.'4 Those same charges of misconduct
were then recycled in a separate civil action by the developer against three city
councilors and the neighborhood association and two of its officers. 5 That lawsuit
claimed a loss of $3 million, plus punitive damages and attorney fees, against the
neighbors and the three councilors personally.' 6 The complaint included separate
counts for tort, malicious abuse of process, civil conspiracy, violation of civil rights,
and conspiracy to violate civil rights.' 7 It claimed injury to the developer caused by
the neighbors' "delay strategy" and the City Council's disapproval of his Los
Vecinos project.' 8
After the state court action was removed to federal court, due to the developer's
federal civil rights claims that sought to support an award of his attorney fees, the
Attorney General of New Mexico filed an amicus brief urging immediate dismissal
of this "classic" SLAPP suit."' The Attorney General's Brief proclaimed "his
concern about the improper use of the courts to deter New Mexico citizens from
exercising their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances and to deprive governmental bodies of the benefits of public
participation in the political process."2

11. For the history, see Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Conspiracy to Deprive Citizens
of Their Constitutional Right to Speech and Petition for Malicious Abuse ofProcess and for Infliction of Emotional
Distress. Greater Callecita Neighborhood Ass'n v. Hyde ParkCo.,No. 99-Civ.-00837 MV (D.N.M. July 29,1999).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Third Amended Petition for a Writ ofMandamus and Complaint to Vacate and Set Aside Unlawful and
Unreasonable Denial of Final Subdivision Plat Approval and for Damages for Violation of Civil Rights, State ex
rel. Hyde Park Co. v. City Council of Santa Fe, No. SF D-0101-C-0097-01427 (1 st Jud. Dist. N.M. filed July 23,
1998).
15. First Amended Complaint for Damages for Prima Facie Tort, Malicious Abuse of Process, Civil
Conspiracy, Violation of Civil Rights and Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights, Punitive Damages and Attorney's
Fees, Hyde Park Co. v. Greater Callecita Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 98-Civ.-0821 JP/LCS (D.N.M. July 18, 1998).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New Mexico at 1, Hyde Park Co. v. Greater
Callecita Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 98-Civ.-0821 JP/LCS (D.N.M. July 18, 1998).
20. Id.at1.
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Never reaching these First Amendment issues, United States District Judge James
Parker dismissed the developer's federal civil rights claims because the developer's
subdivision application created no constitutionally protected property right, and that
decision was upheld on appeal.2 1 Soon after Judge Parker's ruling, the developer's
state law claims for business torts were abandoned. All bias and prejudice claims
against the City Council were recently dismissed, with prejudice, by stipulation on
the eve of trial.22 In the end, therefore, the Los Vecinos case collapsed and the
developer' s SLAPP litigation failed-but only after having terrorized the neighbors
and scared Santa Fe citizens through several years of high-profile and media-hyped
SLAPP litigation. Conversely, a "SLAPP-back" countersuit filed by the neighbors
against the developer, his counsel, and two former city officials alleging a corrupt
conspiracy to facilitate the developer's project was settled by the city, and then
dismissed as to the other defendants for lack of enough factual specificity to show
23
a federal civil rights conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit recently upheld that ruling;
however, the neighbors' state law claims for malicious abuse of process based on
the developer's abortive SLAPP suits remain unresolved.
2. The Albuquerque Wal-Mart Case
Another prominent example of a SLAPP lawsuit in New Mexico is the
Albuquerque case involving efforts by three neighborhood associations to block
development of a shopping center, which included a Wal-Mart Superstore and a
Home Depot. The neighborhood associations voiced their opposition to the
proposed development before the City of Albuquerque's Planning Department,
Environmental Planning Commission, the Land Use Planning and Zoning
Committee of the City Council, and the City Council. After the City Council
approved the development plan, the neighborhood associations appealed that
decision to the state district court.24 After the district court denied their appeal, the
associations filed an appeal in the New Mexico Court of Appeals.25
Before the neighborhood associations filed their appeal of the city's approval of
the development project in the district court, the counsel for the developer,
Geltmore, Inc., sent a letter to counsel for the neighborhood associations advising
counsel to inform their clients that an appeal to the district court "might expose
[them] to the possibility of significant financial liability," and that their "clients
should consider this matter very seriously before they file, as they will find out
afterwards that litigation is serious, stressful, expensive, and mostly futile"

21. Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000).
22. State ex rel. Hyde Park Co. v. City Council of Santa Fe, No. D-0101-C-00097-01427 (1st Jud. Dist.
N.M. July 19, 2001).
23. Greater Callecita Neighborhood Ass'n v. Hyde Park Co., No. 00-2398, 2001 WL 892778 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2001).
24. West Bluff Neighborhood Ass'n, Grande Heights Neighborhood Ass'n, and West Area Residents for
Aesthetic and Responsible Expansion v. City of Albuquerque and Geltmore, Inc., No. CV 99-12584 (2d Jud. Dist.
N.M. filed Dec. 22, 1999).
25. West Bluff Neighborhood Ass'n, Grande Heights Neighborhood Ass'n, and West Area Residents for
Aesthetic and Responsible Expansion v. City of Albuquerque and Geltmore, Inc., No. 21,743 (Ct. App. N.M. filed
Oct. 2, 2000).
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(emphasis in original).26 The letter expressly threatened a lawsuit if the
neighborhood associations filed an appeal, stating, "Geltmore has instructed us to
give fair warning that it intends to pursue damages from those responsible if
Geltmore incurs a loss of income or lost financial opportunity as a result of
meritless actions on your part. Additionally, you should be aware that the current
owners of the property could also seek redress on their own if they suffer
damages."27
After the neighborhood associations nevertheless filed their appeal to the district
court, the developer of the shopping center, Geltmore, Inc., and ten individuals
carried out their threat and on June 22, 2000, filed a lawsuit2" against the three
neighborhood associations-the West Bluff Neighborhood Association, Grande
Heights Neighborhood Association, and West Area Residents for Aesthetic and
Responsible Expansion. The complaint further named as defendants four individual
association members who had been active in representing their associations'
opposition before the city agencies and City Council and in the district court appeal.
Besides Geltmore, Inc., the plaintiffs included individuals who owned property that
would be part of the development and other people who resided near the
development and were members of the West Bluff Neighborhood Association. The
complaint alleged nine causes of action, including malicious abuse of process,
prima facie tort, and conspiracy,29 and sought injunctive relief as well as
compensatory and punitive damages including claims for lost profits, higher interest
rates, additional expenses, and attorney fees and costs.3 °
On August 11, 2000, the neighborhood associations moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the allegations all related to the associations'
constitutionally protected activities in petitioning the City of Albuquerque to deny
approval of the development or reduce its scale and in appealing the city's decision
to the district court.3" The neighborhood associations claimed that the lawsuit was
a SLAPP suit because the crux of the allegations, which formed the basis of all nine
causes of action, challenged their public participation in legitimate forums in
opposing the proposed development.3 2 In their view, such petitioning activities and
resort to the courts were constitutionally immunized from liability under the United
States Supreme Court's Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,33 which protects the right of

26. Letter from Victor R. Marshall, Attorney for Geltmore, Inc., to Peter Chestnut, Ann B. Rodgers, and
Donald A. Peterson, attorneys for the three neighborhood associations at 1-2, Dec. 20, 1999.
27. Id.at4.

28. Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed June 22, 2000).
29. Id. The Complaint included the following counts: (1)Misuse and Violation of New Mexico Nonprofit
Corporation Act, (2) Misuse and Violation of Albuquerque Neighborhood Association Recognition Act, (3)
Violation of New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, (4) Malicious Abuse of Process, (5) Negligent Representation, (6)
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, (7) Fraud and False Pretenses, (8) Prima Facie Tort, and (9) Conspiracy.
30. Id.
31. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Defendants West Bluff Neighborhood Ass'n,

Grande Heights Neighborhood Ass'n, and West Area Residents for Aesthetic and Responsible Expansion, Saylor
v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed Aug. 11, 2000).
32. Id.
at 8.
33. Id.at 7-8, referring to a doctrine developed from United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965), and Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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citizens "to petition the Government for redress of grievances"34 guaranteed by the
First Amendment.
The district court on October 30, 2000, dismissed the complaint with prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to any of the counts
raised therein.35 Judge William Lang ruled that the "Petition Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution affords absolute protection and
immunity to defendants for the actions complained of in the plaintiffs' complaint,
36
either for damages or for injunctive relief.
Geltmore and the other plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their
action to the New Mexico Court of Appeals.37 The Attorney General of the State of
New Mexico submitted a brief as amicus curiae in support of the neighborhood
associations and individual defendants because of "concern about the improper use
of the courts to deter New Mexico citizens from exercising their First Amendment
right to petition the government for redress of grievances and to deprive
governmental bodies of the benefits of public participation in the political
process. ' 38 The Attorney General expressed concern that the complaint filed by
Geltmore and the other plaintiffs constituted a "strategic lawsuit against public
participation" or "SLAPP." 39 Indeed, the Attorney General viewed the allegations
in the complaint as fairly raising "a question about whether Plaintiffs' interest in
filing the lawsuit was truly to resolve their claims and vindicate their rights, or, like
SLAPP, was to punish Defendants for their attempts to influence the City's decision
regarding the shopping center and deter similar attempts in the future. ' 40 Notably,
the Attorney General's brief cited New Mexico's recently enacted anti-SLAPP law
and stated that the district court had "correctly anticipated and applied the public
policy underlying the legislation against the misuse of the legal process to chill the
exercise of the constitutional right to petition."'" This appeal is currently pending
before the New Mexico Court of Appeals.

34. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The defendant associations asserted that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine provided
immunity for their petitioning activities. In addition to the constitutional argument, the neighborhood associations
claimed the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted.
35. See Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud.
Dist. N.M. filed Oct. 30, 2000).
36. Id. at 2. In addition, Judge Lang ruled that two counts in the complaint relied on statutes that provided
no private right of action that would entitle the plaintiffs to damages or injunctive relief. Plaintiffs filed a motion
asking Judge Lang to reconsider his ruling dismissing plaintiffs' claims against defendants without leave to amend.
See Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed Nov.
15, 2000). Judge Lang found that "Plaintiffs' Motion is not well-taken" and denied the motion for reconsideration.
See Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d. Jud. Dist.
N.M. filed Dec. 8, 2000).
37. See Notice of Appeal, Saylor v. Valles, No. CV-2000-06283 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed Jan. 8, 2001).
The docket number in the New Mexico Court of Appeals is No. 22,027.
38. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New Mexico at 1, Saylor v. Valles, No.
22,027 (N.M. Ct. App. filed Sept. 14, 2001). This same concern was expressed in the Attorney General's amicus
brief filed in the Santa Fe Los Vecinos litigation. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New
Mexico at 1, Hyde Park Co. v. Greater Callecita Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 98-Civ.-0821 JP/LCS (D.N.M. July 18,
1998).
39. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New Mexico at 1, Saylor v. Valles, No. 22,027
(N.M. Ct. App. filed Sept. 14, 2001).
40. Id.
at 16.
41. Id. at 14.
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In the latest chapter of this Wal-Mart story, the four individuals sued by the
developer filed a countersuit, a so-called SLAPP-back suit, in the state district court
on October 24, 2001.42 The neighborhood associations named as defendants in the
suit by the developer are not parties to this action. The complaint names as
defendants all of the plaintiffs who sued the defendants and names Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. as an additional defendant. The suit pleads two causes of action, one for
malicious abuse of process, and the other for civil conspiracy, both based on
allegations that the "[d]efendants intentionally initiated the SLAPP Lawsuit against
Plaintiffs, and abused the judicial process, with an improper purpose to intimidate,
frighten, silence, and retaliate against Plaintiffs, and to chill other citizens, and
without any reasonable belief whatsoever in the validity of the allegations of fact
or law of the SLAPP Lawsuit."43 In addition, the complaint alleges that defendants
Silverman, Geltmore, Saylor, and Wal-Mart conspired with one another and their
attorney to bring the SLAPP lawsuit against the plaintiffs." The plaintiffs in the
SLAPP-back suit requested compensatory damages, punitive damages, pre-and postjudgment interest, and costs incurred in this litigation.4 5 The SLAPP-back action is
pending in the district court, while the developer's appeal from the dismissal of his
SLAPP suit is pending in the court of appeals.
C. FirstAmendment Protectionsfor PetitioningActivities
The First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and petitioning immunize a
broad range of citizens' conduct to promote or oppose official action by government
at all levels. 46 The right to petition the government enshrined in the Constitution
goes back centuries and predates the Bill of Rights. First applying those protections
in an antitrust case, the U.S. Supreme Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine
immunized a deceptive, "unethical," and "reprehensible" lobbying campaign by the
railroads designed to destroy competition by the trucking industry for long-haul
freight business, on the basis of the constitutional "right of the people to inform
their representatives in47government of their desires with respect to the passage or
enforcement of laws.,
Following the Noerrdecision, the doctrine's broad First Amendment protections
have been applied to vindicate citizens' activities to induce legislative, judicial, or
administrative action challenged in a variety of state law contexts.48 As for land-use
controversies, citizens' activities to seek zoning changes or to oppose road access
to a subdivision have been immunized as protected petitioning under the First

42. Valles v. Silverman, No. CV-2001-07282 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. filed Oct. 24, 2001).
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 10-11.
45. Id. at 11.
46. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 7; Briefs of Amicus Curiae Attorney General, supra notes 19 and 38.
47. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139-45 (1961).
48. See Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897, 914-16 (10th Cir. 2000) (listing cases applying First Amendment
petitioning immunity to various state law actions); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 208
F.3d 885 & 896 (10th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that First Amendment petition clause protects right to sue but
not pre-litigation threats); see also Devaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 124 N.M. 512, 519 P.2d 277, 284 n.1
(1997) (holding that access to courts protected by First Amendment compels narrow scope for malicious abuse of
process tort).
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Amendment.' Notably, a recent Connecticut decision applied the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to immunize a neighborhood group and its lawyer who had been sued by
a developer for vexatiously opposing his mall project before a city zoning
commission and before various courts for more than ten years. In the Court's view,
failure to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine aggressively may create a
"chilling effect" on the first amendment right to petition in zoning
and other
matters .... Indeed, such a chilling effect can be a virtual deep freeze when
individual citizens not versed in the legal system and without financial resources
do not exercise potentially meritorious legal challenges for fear of costly and
protracted, retributive litigation from opponents."0
Strengthening those First Amendment protections is the New Mexico Attorney
General's statutory authority to support SLAPP victims in court.5 Her recent
amicus brief in the court of appeals not only supports the district court's dismissal
of the Wal-Mart SLAPP suit in Albuquerque, but also invokes the "important public
policy of this state, codified in the recently enacted anti-SLAPP law."52
Significantly, the Attorney General is required by law to appear before local, state,
and federal courts "to represent and to be heard on behalf of the state when, in his
judgment, the public interest of the state requires such action."53
D. Need for Early Dismissalof SLAPP Suits
As dramatized by the Attorney General's briefs and pleas for immediate
dismissal in the Santa Fe Los Vecinos and the Albuquerque Wal-Mart litigation, a
critical aspect of the First Amendment's protection of citizens' petitioning is early
identification of SLAPP suits, before SLAPP victims are subjected to discovery and
other pretrial maneuvers to wear them down or bleed them dry. Unless stopped by
upfront rulings on the face of the complaint, so as to cut through conclusory
allegations and to pierce camouflage claims, a sharp SLAPP lawyer's campaign to
terrorize opponents of a developer's project can muster a host of hardball tactics to
punish people before the case is ever tried or judged on the merits.
But due to the paramount protection of people's First Amendment rights, courts
have fashioned early dismissal procedures by upfront rulings on a SLAPP target's
constitutional defenses, as a matter of law. Thus, in a prominent zoning case, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the developer must show, in order to overcome
a motion to dismiss, that the neighbors' petitioning activities were not immunized
by the First Amendment.54 Shifting the burden of proof to the developer to

49. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607,614-15 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that neighbors and
lawyer were "absolutely privileged" to petition for zoning amendment thwarting project, challenged as conspiracy
with planning officials); Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 745 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding
neighbors immune from conspiracy liability for petitioning town officials against subdivision road access).
50. Zeller v. Consolini, 758 A.2d 376, 382 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
51. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2(J) (1978).
52. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New Mexico at 16, Saylor v. Valles, No. 22,027
(N.M. Ct. App. filed Sept. 14,2001).
53. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2(J) (1978).
54. Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. for the County of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Colo.
1984) (en banc).
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overcome and prevail on the First Amendment issues, the court declared that
petitioning activities would not be immunized only if shown to lack any reasonable
factual support or legal basis, and if their primary purpose was improper
harassment." Some New Mexico courts faced with First Amendment defenses by
citizens who were sued for their land-use opposition activities also have granted
upfront motions to dismiss on constitutional grounds. Judge Lang's dismissal in the
Wal-Mart case56 and Judge Hall's dismissal of a Taos developer's spurious
countersuit57 arising from a dispute under the New Mexico Subdivision Act58
provide two recent examples.
Significantly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has facilitated resistance to
SLAPP suits by merging the previously separate torts of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process into the new hybrid tort of malicious abuse of process.59 Rebuffing
a lawsuit against a "whistleblower" for publicizing his business firm's malfeasance,
the Supreme Court (1) abolished previous requirements for a favorable termination
of the underlying lawsuit and for proof of special damages prior to raising a
malicious abuse of process claim and (2) allowed counterclaims for malicious abuse
of process, albeit under higher proof standards, to be brought against still-pending
complaints attacking a defendant's exercise of protected First Amendment rights.
Even without the new anti-SLAPP legislation, therefore, New Mexico courts could
dismiss SLAPP suits in egregious circumstances or permit a counterclaim against
the SLAPPer.
11. NEW MEXICO'S ANTI-SLAPP LAW OF 2001
As signed into law on April 3, 2001, by Governor Gary Johnson, New Mexico
has enacted landmark legislation to curtail SLAPP suits that intimidate citizens in
the exercise of their constitutional petitioning rights. Under bipartisan sponsorship
by Representatives Patsy Trujillo-Knauer, a Santa Fe Democrat, and Pauline
Gubbels, an Albuquerque Republican, the statute was backed by many SLAPP
victims and a broad spectrum of supporters, many of whom testified-including
representatives of Attorney General Patricia Madrid, the cities of Albuquerque and
Santa Fe, civil rights and neighborhood associations, as well as environmental and
some business groups. After a broad version of House Bill 241 had passed the
House,' the Association of Commerce and Industry (ACI) and National Association
of Industrial and Office Properties (NAIOP) vowed to kill the bill as one-sided and
going too far. But after a statewide media and lobbying campaign coordinated by
the New Mexico NoSLAPP Alliance, a midnight compromise bill was brokered by
Senator Shannon Robinson, an Albuquerque Democrat who was chairman of the
Senate Public Affairs Committee.6t Further amendments were made by the Senate

55. Id.
56. Dan McKay, Judge Tosses Lawsuit Against Wal-Mart Foes, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 6, 2000, at D2.
57. Kathryn Holzka, Taos Suits Dropped, Dismissed, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 25, 1999, at Al.
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-6-1 through 47-6-29 (1978 & Supp. 1999).
59. DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 124 N.M. 512, 519 P.2d 277, 284 n.l (1997).
60. See H.B. 241, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
61. See Senate Public Affairs Committee's amendments to H.B. 241,45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001). This
version was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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Judiciary Committee6 2 before House Bill 241 was passed by the Senate in the
waning hours on the last day of the session and then quickly adopted by House
voice vote, driven by a coalition of support from all sides. The final text included
provisions for early dismissal of SLAPP suits, but left important ambiguities and
gaps for future clarification, as explained below.
A. The New Anti-SLAPP Law
Effective June 15, 2001, New Mexico's anti-SLAPP law contains provisions that
specify the process for handling SLAPP suits, coupled with legislative findings that
illuminate the public policy and statutory purpose in aid of its judicial
implementation.63 In particular, the statute authorizes a SLAPP defendant to file a
special motion to dismiss and to obtain an expedited ruling on this special motion
in order to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation.' In addition, the statute
requires the trial court to award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the SLAPP
defendant who prevails on the special motion, or to the party opposing the motion
if the court finds that the special motion is frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay. 65 Finally, the new law gives either party the right to an expedited
appeal from the trial court's order on the special motion or from the trial court's
failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.'
ARTICLE 2
Pleadings and Motions
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1 (2001)
§ 38-2-9.1. Special motion to dismiss unwarranted or specious lawsuits;
procedures; sanctions; severability
A. Any action seeking money damages against a person for conduct or speech
undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a
quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any
political subdivision of the state is subject to a special motion to dismiss, motion
for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be
considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis to ensure the early
consideration of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent the unnecessary
expense of litigation.

62. See Senate Judiciary Committee's amendments to H.B. 241,45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
63. With no limiting text providing otherwise, public as well as private entities are subject to the statutory
provisions if they file SLAPP actions challenging constitutionally protected petitioning conduct. Indeed, lawsuits
by governmental bodies against citizens for exercising their First Amendment rights become the "ultimate SLAPP"
by subverting the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Board of County Comm'rs v. Shroyer, 662 F. Supp. 1542, 1544-46 (D. Colo.
1987) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270(1964)). For analysis and discussion, see PRING
& CANAN, supra note 7, at 46-82.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001). This provision also authorizes two other special motions-a
motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment.
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(C) (2001).
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B. If the rights afforded by this section are raised as an affirmative defense and
if a court grants a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings or
a motion for summary judgment filed within ninety days of the filing of the
moving party's answer, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred by the moving party in defending the action. If the court finds that a
special motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment is frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable
attorney fees to the party prevailing on the motion.
C. Any party shall have the right to an expedited appeal from a trial court order
on the special motions described in Subsection B of this section or from a trial
court's failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.
D. As used in this section, a "public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding"
means and includes any meeting established and held by a state or local
governmental entity, including without limitations, meetings or presentations
before state, city, town or village councils, planning commissions, review
boards or commissions.
E. Nothing in this section limits or prohibits the exercise of a right or remedy of
a party granted pursuant to another constitutional, statutory, common law or
administrative provision, including civil actions for defamation or malicious
abuse of process.
F. If any provision of this section or the application of any provision of this
section to a person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of this section that can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section
are severable.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.2 (2001)
§ 38-2-9.2. Findings and purpose
The legislature declares that it is the public policy of New Mexico to protect the
rights of its citizens to participate in quasi-judicial proceedings before local and
state governmental tribunals. Baseless civil lawsuits seeking or claiming
millions of dollars have been filed against persons for exercising their right to
petition and to participate in quasi-judicial proceedings before governmental
tribunals. Such lawsuits can be an abuse of the legal process and can impose an
undue financial burden on those having to respond to and defend such lawsuits
and may chill and punish participation in public affairs and the institutions of
democratic government. These lawsuits should be subject to prompt dismissal
or judgment to prevent the abuse of the legal process and avoid the burden
imposed by such baseless lawsuits.
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B. Key Anti-SLAPP Elements
Although the statute was cut back from the original House version,67 the final text
nevertheless retains the essentials needed for effective SLAPP curtailment.
1. Early Upfront Dismissals
To protect SLAPP targets from costly discovery and hardball tactics by deeppocket SLAPPers, the text mandates priority and expedited treatment by trial courts
of a "special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion
for summary judgment"' that is based on the First Amendment immunity of SLAPP
targets. Whatever is claimed in a complaint for damages, whether pleaded as a
business tort, as defamation, or as a conspiracy, the statute guarantees an expedited
ruling on a target's First Amendment immunities for any petitioning conduct to
influence official action. Because such dispositive constitutional defenses may be
adjudicated as a matter of law, from the allegations in the complaint and the special
motion, the statutory process is designed to ensure upfront dismissals of SLAPP
suits without pretrial discovery or dilatory maneuvers and without going into factual
details of the complaint's camouflage claims of business torts. Indeed, the statute
expressly states that the purpose of the expedited consideration of the special
motion is "to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation"69 that discovery and
other pretrial maneuvers would entail.
Although the anti-SLAPP law does not explicitly state that the special motion
must be based on First Amendment rights, the text of the statute provides that the
special motion to dismiss must be premised on the "affirmative defense"7 that the
movant was exercising the right to engage in "conduct or speech undertaken or
made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial
proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision
of the state."'" Moreover, the legislative findings recognize that baseless lawsuits
claiming damages "against persons for exercising their right to petition and to
participate in quasi-judicial proceedings before governmental tribunals... should be
subject to prompt dismissal. 7 2 Since the activities subject to the special statutory
motions are protected by the First Amendment, 73 the anti-SLAPP law essentially
establishes an expedited process for raising and vindicating First Amendment rights.

67. The text of the original bill as introduced is set forth in Appendix A. Significantly, the statutory text
rather than legislative history controls statutory interpretations. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Teachers'
Fed'n, 125 N.M. 401, 411, 962 P.2d 1236, 1246 (1998) ("Unlike some states, we have no state-sponsored system
of recording the legislative history of particular enactments. We do not attempt to divine what legislators read and
heard and thought at the time they enacted a particular item of legislation. Ifthe intentions of the Legislature cannot
be determined from the actual language of a statute, then we resort to rules of statutory construction, not legislative
history.").
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001).
69. Id.
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001). Although affirmative defenses are generally raised by answer,
an affirmative defense that is premised on constitutional immunity may be resolved by motion to dismiss. N.M.

R. Ctv. P. 1-012(B).
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001).
73. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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Opponents of the bill succeeded in diluting some procedural protections for
SLAPP targets. As introduced and approved by the House Judiciary Committee,
House Bill 241 expressly provided for suspension of discovery pending decision on
the special motion and on any appeal therefrom.74 The Senate Public Affairs
Committee deleted the explicit discovery suspension provision,75 but inserted a
directive that special motions shall be considered on an expedited basis "to prevent
the unnecessary expense of litigation."76 The Senate version, therefore, replaced the
automatic stay of discovery with a more generalized direction and rationale for
expedited rulings to alleviate the financial impact on targets of SLAPP litigation.
The original version also placed on a SLAPP plaintiff the express burden of
establishing by "clear and convincing evidence" that the challenged acts were not
constitutionally protected conduct or speech.77 The Senate amendments likewise
deleted those explicit burden of proof requirements to overcome a SLAPP target's
special motion.78 Although the statute thus leaves courts to determine burden and
standard of proof issues, the legislature's paramount purpose of protecting SLAPP
victims suggests that courts should construe the statute to require a SLAPP plaintiff
to bear the burden of showing that the complaint does not punish, intimidate, or
retaliate against people for exercising their First Amendment rights and that the
complaint does not abuse the legal process.79
Furthermore, the statute contains no timeline defining the "priority or expedited
basis"8 for ruling on the statutory special motions. The only time period appears
in the subsection providing that if the court grants the special motion "within ninety
days of the filing of the moving party's answer, the court shall award reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred by the moving party in defending the action."'" This
subsection, however, does not compel the trial court to rule on the special motion
within ninety days; instead, it merely suggests that the special motion should be
filed within ninety days of the answer date. Particularly since the motion to dismiss
may be filed in lieu of an answer, the courts are left to determine what is meant by
ruling on a "priority or expedited basis" in a particular case. Due to the concomitant
statutory right to an expedited appeal from a trial court's failure to rule on a special
motion on an expedited basis,82 a specific timeline set by the judiciary would

74. H.B. 241 § 2(B), 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001), introduced by Rep. Patsy G. Trujillo and Rep.
Pauline Gubbels. (The text of the original bill is set forth in Appendix A.) This provision was also included in the
House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241 § 2(B).
75. Senate Public Affairs Committee Substitute for H.B. 241,45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
76. Id. § B.
77. See the original bill, H.B. 241 § 2(B), 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001) in Appendix A. The House
Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241 retained the express burden of proof on the respondent provision but
deleted the "clear and convincing" standard.
78. See Senate Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241, 45th Leg. 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
79. See Legislative Findings and Purpose, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001). Cf.Baker v. Parsons, 750
N.E.2d 953,961 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a SLAPPer must "show by preponderance of evidence that the moving
party lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning activity"; also surveying
each state's SLAPP statute criteria).
80. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001).
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001).
82. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-9.1(C) (2001).
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remove such temporal uncertainties and give substance
to the right to an early
dismissal as well as the right to appeal a failure to rule. 83
2. Appellate Review of the Trial Court's Consideration of the Special Motion
to Dismiss
Reinforcing the statutory mandate for early rulings on First Amendment defenses
raised by a SLAPP target, the Act also provides for expedited appeals not only from
court rulings on the merits of a motion to dismiss but also from a court's failure to
rule on such motions on an expedited basis.' This provision raises several issues
that are not specifically addressed by the statutory text. First, does this provision
create a right to an interlocutory appeal? Second, what procedures and time limits
does the expedited appeal entail? Third, what power do courts have to prescribe the
procedures for implementing this right to appeal?
The anti-SLAPP law creates a right to an interlocutory appeal, although the
statute does not use the term. The text specifically states that "[any party shall have
the right to an expedited appeal from a trial court order on the special motions
described in Subsection B." 5 The motions listed in Subsection B are pretrial
motions,86 and an appeal from a pretrial ruling before final judgment is necessarily
interlocutory in nature. Moreover, the legislature has the power to create a right to
an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has recognized the
authority of the legislature to establish appellate jurisdiction 87 and to create a right
of appeal.88 Such legislative authority derives from the New Mexico Constitution89
and does not conflict with the judicial power to regulate procedure, because the
creation of a "right to appeal is a matter of substantive law.""

83. The Supreme Court of New Mexico should adopt a rule specifying thirty days as the deadline for rulings
on special motions. For example, Rule 59 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure requires a ruling on motions
for new trial within thirty days or the motion will be considered denied. N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-059(D). Similarly,
post-judgment motions must be decided within thirty days or the motions will be deemed denied. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-1-1 (1978 & Supp. 2001). In light of those precedents, a Supreme Court rule setting such a time limit of thirty
days for rulings on a statutory special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for
summary judgment would effectuate the legislative purpose of subjecting SLAPP suits "to prompt dismissal or
judgment to prevent the abuse of the legal process and avoid the burden imposed by such baseless lawsuits." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001).
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(C) (2001).
85. Id.
86. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001) lists three pretrial motions subject to expedited rulings-motion
to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, and motion for summary judgment.
87. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 339, 805 P.2d 603, 606 (1991) ("The appellate
jurisdiction of both this Court and the court of appeals is within the legislative power to prescribe.").
88. See State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 314, 183 P.2d 845, 846 (1947) ("The creating of a right of appeal
is a matter of substantive law and outside the province of the court's rule making power.").
89. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
90. See Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846. Because the right to appeal is a matter of substantive law,
and not procedure, there is no conflict between the legislative and judicial powers that would invoke theAmmerman
doctrine, which resolves "any conflict between court rules and statutes that relate to procedure.. .in favor of the
[court] rules." Southwest Cmty. Health Services v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 198, 755 P.2d 40,42 (1988) (reiterating
the rule of Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)). For a detailed analysis of
the separation of powers doctrine and the Ammerman decision, see Michael Browde & M.E. Occhialino,
Separationof Powers andthe JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Needfor PrudentialConstraints,
15 N.M. L. REV. 407 (1985).
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The anti-SLAPP statute, however, does more than create a right to interlocutory
appeal; it also provides for an "expedited" appeal. The statute does not define what
an expedited appeal means, but the legislative purpose set forth in the statute makes
clear that the legislature intended a prompt appellate review. The statute, however,
prescribes no particular procedure for accelerating the conventional appellate
process. Instead, the legislature leaves it to the appellate courts to fashion how to
expedite a statutory appeal. By leaving the manner of processing the appeal to the
judiciary, the statute does not trench on the constitutional powers of the judicial
branch to regulate the procedural aspects of taking and perfecting an appeal." In
short, the expedited appeal provision neither regulates the appellate process nor
directs exactly when or how an appeal must be heard by the appellate courts. The
statute, therefore, conflicts with no court rule of appellate procedure and raises no
separation of powers problem.92
As a practical matter, appellate courts can choose among various rules adopted
for accelerating special appeals-appeals that depart from the usual appeals from
final judgments. For example, the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure
93
specify shorter time periods for filing interlocutory appeals, for appeals of bail
decisions in criminal cases, 94 and for appeals from orders suppressing or excluding
evidence in a criminal case. 95 Significantly, none of these rules accelerating the
appellate process prescribes any limit on the time for the court to rule on the appeal
itself. The statutory "right to an expedited appeal" likewise sets no time within
which the appellate court must rule. Overall, the statutory direction thus leaves it
to the courts to determine just what is an expedited appeal and how to implement
this right by specific rules or on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, the legislature
respected the judicial power to regulate court procedures and management
functions.96
In addition to what is meant by "expedited" in the appeal provision of the antiSLAPP law, the right to appeal "from a trial court's failure to rule on the motion"
also presents implementation questions. How does an appellate court handle a
failure to rule by a trial court? Does the appellate review mean that the appellate
court enters an order directing that the trial court forthwith rule on the First
Amendment issue? Does the appellate court take over for the trial court and decide

91. Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
92. Although Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 36, 791 P.2d 788, 790 (1990), says that "the legislature has
no power to fix the time within which an appeal must be heard by the supreme court in appeals from the district
courts," citing Ammerman, the statute considered in Maples conflicted with a court rule. Id. Because the antiSLAPP statute prescribes no fixed time for an expedited appeal and has no provision that conflicts with a court rule
regarding the time and manner of taking and perfecting an appeal, the legislature has not attempted to regulate the
appellate process and has not intruded directly into the courts' constitutional powers. See supra notes 88 and 90.
93. N.M. R. App. P. 12-203. For interlocutory appeals, the application for appeal must be filed within fifteen
days of the trial court order, and the respondent has fifteen days to respond to the application.
94. N.M. R. App. P. 12-204. This appeal must be filed within ten days of the decision, and the state has five
days to file a response.
95. N.M. R. App. P. 12-201(A)(1). This appeal must be filed within ten days of the decision, but there is
no time limit for the response.
96. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 340-41, 805 P.2d 603, 606-08 (1991). The New
Mexico Supreme Court said that "rules relating to pleading, practice, and procedure in the courts, particularly
where those rules relate to court management or housekeeping functions," are subject to the rule-making power
of the Supreme Court. Id.
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the special motion on its own? Does the appellate court treat the failure to rule by
the district court on a timely basis as a denial of the motion, or conversely, as a
constructive grant of the appeal as well as the underlying special motion? Since the
statute offers no guidance, the appellate court is left to answer these questions in
order to give meaning to the right to appeal from a failure to rule. Here, too, the
legislative declaration of purpose should inform the appellate court's determination
of how to proceed with such an appeal. This statutory purpose-to make lawsuits
that chill and punish participation in public affairs and the institutions of democratic
government subject to prompt dismissal in order to prevent the abuse of the legal
process and avoid the burden imposed by such baseless lawsuits 97-should favor
a prompt procedure that avoids all further delays and costs due to a district court's
failure to rule in a timely manner.
Without a specific provision addressing a district court's failure to rule, a writ of
mandamus may effectuate the statutory right to an expedited appeal from a trial
court's failure to rule on a special motion on an expedited basis. According to the
New Mexico Supreme Court, mandamus is a proper remedy for compelling a
district court to act when such action is required by law and no discretion is
involved.9 8 The anti-SLAPP law directs that special motions "shall be considered
by the court on a priority or expedited basis." Although a district judge may retain
discretion as to how to calendar priority or expedited matters, the court has no
discretion to avoid a ruling on the motion itself. At some point, therefore, failure to
rule becomes tantamount to failure to consider the motion on a priority or expedited
basis, and a writ of mandamus lies. Just when that point arrives must be judged by
a higher court in a given case. Thus, unless and until the New Mexico Supreme
Court promulgates a pertinent rule,' mandanmus or other prerogative writs can prod
trial courts to rule promptly on special statutory motions to dismiss SLAPP
complaints.' °°
3. Shifting of Legal Fees
Providing a financial disincentive for SLAPP filers to intimidate citizens, the
statute mandates the payment of attorney fees and costs incurred by a SLAPP victim

97. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-1 (1978 & Supp. 2001) (failure
to rule on a post-judgment motion within thirty days of the filing of the motion shall be deemed denied).
98. Sender v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 287,291,387 P.2d 860,863-64 (1963) (finding that mandamus is proper
remedy to require district court to dismiss the proceeding below where the dismissal was mandatory under existing
law), overruled on other grounds by State v. Apodaca, 91 N.M. 279, 573 P.2d 213 (1977).
99. For example, Rule 1-059 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure treats a district court's failure
to rule on a motion for new trial within thirty days as an automatic denial of the motion. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-059(D).
See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-1 (1978 & Supp. 2001) (stating that failure to rule on a post-judgment motion
within thirty days means the motion shall be deemed denied). To effectuate the anti-SLAPP law's legislative
purpose, the New Mexico Supreme Court could adopt a special rule, limited to the special statutory motions,
treating the failure to rule within thirty days as tantamount to grant of the motion, or as an automatic denial
allowing an immediate appeal therefrom. Such a new rule could be placed in N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-007.1, which
concerns motions, as a separate provision, or be added as an entirely new rule.
100. See also Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (issuing peremptory
writ of mandamus directing entry of order granting special motion to strike and to dismiss SLAPP complaint
without pretrial discovery, as a matter of law; also upholding constitutionality of California anti-SLAPP statute).
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who prevails on a motion to dismiss the complaint.'0 ' The prospect of quick

dismissals plus payment of the victim's legal fees will discourage potential

SLAPPers and their lawyers from filing SLAPP suits altogether.° 2 In addition, such
fee awards level the playing field because they enable SLAPP targets to engage
lawyers to take their case, without having to pay upfront legal fees for handling

meritorious First Amendment defenses.
The statute mandates the award of attorney fees and costs incurred by the SLAPP
target who files a special motion to dismiss if (1) the motion raises as an affirmative
defense the rights to petition and to participate in proceedings before governmental

tribunals and (2) the trial court grants the special motion that was filed within ninety

days of the filing of the moving party's answer.0 3 Although the ninety-day term
appears in the subsection regarding the award of attorney fees and costs, the text
suggests that the legislature did not intend to make a ruling within ninety days of

the answer a condition for the award of attorney fees-particularly since no answer

might ever be filed.°4' In light of the statute's overarching remedial purpose, a ruling
in favor of the SLAPP defendant's motion on First Amendment grounds is the
critical factor in awarding attorney fees so long as the motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment was timely filed.'0 5
Although the statute also authorizes an award of attorney fees to a SLAPP
plaintiff who defeats a special motion to dismiss, different standards apply to
SLAPP victims and to SLAPPers.' ° The SLAPP target need only win the motion
to dismiss in order to be awarded attorney fees and costs. For a prevailing SLAPP
plaintiff, however, attorney fees and costs are authorized only if the court finds that
motion to dismiss is "frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary
the special
10 7
delay."'

101. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B)(2001).
102. See Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741-43 (Cal. 2001) (setting criteria for "enhancement" of legal
fee awards to SLAPP victims prevailing on motion to dismiss).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B)(2001).
104. The special motion to dismiss may be filed in lieu of an answer under Rule 12(B)(6) (failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted). N.M. R. Civ. P. t-012(B)(6).
105. The special motions authorized by the anti-SLAPP statute are timely filed if filed within ninety days
of the filing of the answer. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001). An answer to a SLAPP complaint must be filed
within thirty days after service of the complaint. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-012(A).
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (B) (2001). CompareMitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th
Cir. 2000) (noting that attorney fees are routinely awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in federal civil rights litigation,
but awards to prevailing defendants are "rarely" granted and only if the complaint was vexatious, frivolous, or
harassing).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(B) (2001). The original bill, H.B. 241 (set forth in Appendix A), did not
establish different standards for movants and respondents. Section D provided that whoever prevailed should be
awarded litigation costs, including reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred in connection with the
motion. The original bill, Section E,also authorized additional sanctions against the SLAPP plaintiff if the court
granted the motion and the moving party demonstrated that the SLAPP lawsuit was filed to harass, inhibit pubic
participation, interfere with protected constitutional rights, or injure the moving party. The additional sanctions
included actual damages to the moving party and disciplinary referrals of the responsible attorneys or law firms.
H.B. 241, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001). This provision was deleted by the Senate Public Affairs Committee.
Senate Public Affairs Committee Substitute for House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241,45th Leg., Ist
Sess. (N.M. 2001).
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4. Strong Anti-SLAPP Message
Enabling courts to construe the text of the statute and to fill gaps in a remedial
way, the specially codified legislative findings and purpose provide important
interpretive context. Thus, the legislature's condemnation of "baseless civil lawsuits
seeking or claiming millions of dollars" against "persons for exercising their right
to petition" "' sends a strong signal to courts. Likewise, the statutory findings as to
the financial burdens of SLAPP victims, which "may chill and punish participation
in public affairs and the institutions of democratic government,"' °9 alert both bench
and bar to the legislature's policy to safeguard citizens' constitutional rights to
petition their government. In short, those legislative findings and purpose sound a
bullhorn to bench and bar to stop SLAPP suits as an offense against the public
policy of New Mexico.
C. Evolving Issues of Statutory Interpretation
Due to the cutback of House Bill 241 by the compromises needed for Senate
passage, the statutory text leaves open important issues for judicial interpretation.
However, the task for courts is facilitated by the legislature's findings and purpose
to resolve textual ambiguities, by the pre-existing constitutional case law defining
citizens' conduct protected by the First Amendment, and by expansive
interpretations of the California anti-SLAPP law's analogous text backed by strong
statutory findings."'
1. Scope of Protected Conduct "In Connection With" Administrative
Proceedings
At the root of the statute's murky scope is the compromise between the
supporters who had pushed for broad coverage of all First Amendment-protected
conduct and the strategy of opponents to cut back the bill to cover only conduct in
so-called "quasi-judicial proceedings" as their fallback from killing the Housepassed bill outright. As introduced in the House and approved by the House
Judiciary Committee, the bill provided explicit "immunity from liability" for any
conduct or speech that "has as its primary purpose informing, communicating with,
influencing or otherwise participating in the process of government."' The Senate
deleted the immunity text".2 and limited the conduct and speech subject to a special
statutory motion to dismiss. 3 Thus the Senate Public Affairs Committee narrowed

108. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001).
109. Id.
l10. A survey of pertinent California case law appears in J. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection:
Unburdening the Right of Petition in California,32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 977-84 (1999). Within the past year
alone, the Supreme Courts of California, Georgia, Maine, and Massachusetts have rendered broad interpretations
of their respective states' anti-SIAPP legislation. See Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741-43 (Cal. 2001)
(granting enhancement of legal fee awards to SLAPP victims prevailing on motion to dismiss); Metzler v. Rowell,
547 S.E.2d 311, 314 (Ga. 2001) (addressing scope of activities "in connection with" covered proceedings); Morse
Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842, 850 (Me. 2001) (noting heavy burdens to overcome protected petitioning
claims); Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 958 (Mass. 2001) (observing broad scope of protected petitioning).
111. H.B. 241 § 2(A), 45th Leg., 1st. Sess. (N.M. 2001) (set forth in Appendix A).
112. Senate Judiciary Committee amendments to House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241.
113. Senate Public Affairs Committee amendments to House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241.
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the bill's coverage by specifying that the conduct or speech must be "made in
connection with a public hearing or meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before
a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision of the state." ' 4 In
short, whereas the original version of House Bill 241 provided immunity for all
constitutionally protected conduct or speech affecting the political processwhether through media, at private meetings, or before zoning commissions-the
Senate deleted such special immunities. Instead, by way of a broad savings clause,
the Senate preserved "the exercise of a right or remedy of a party granted pursuant
to another Constitutional, statutory, common law or administrative provision.""5' '
As a result, liabilities depend on legal rights granted elsewhere by law,
conspicuously the First Amendment, so long as such conduct or speech occurred
in
6
connection with public hearings or public meetings as defined by the Act.'
The crux of the bill's ultimate coverage, therefore, is its limitation to actions for
damages that are brought "against a person for conduct or speech undertaken or
made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial
proceeding" (emphasis added)." 7 This text protects petitioning conduct or speech
occurring in connection with either of two distinct settings-a "public hearing" or
a "public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding." The statute specially defines a
"public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding" as including "meetings or
presentations before official tribunals.""' 8 The statute does not, however, define
"public hearing" and does not limit this setting to particular official tribunals. In
sum, the statute extends to any public hearing, whether in a traditionally quasijudicial setting or otherwise." 9 Reference to the two separate settings in the statute,
therefore, protects citizen participation in connection with judicial, quasi-judicial,
administrative, or legislative forums. This reading is confirmed by the legislative
findings and purpose, which not only seek to "protect the rights of citizens to
participate in quasi-judicial proceedings," but also deplore and declare "subject to
prompt dismissal" baseless lawsuits brought "against persons for exercising their
right to petition" (as well as to participate in quasi-judicial proceedings), because
they "may chill and punish participation in public affairs and the institutions of
democratic government."' 2
As to the meaning of "quasi-judicial proceedings," New Mexico case law says
that "administrative hearings which investigate facts, weigh evidence, draw
conclusions as a basis for official action, and exercise discretion of ajudicial nature,
are quasi-judicial in nature."'' For example, public administrative hearings in
zoning proceedings, although they might be deemed "quasi-legislative" rather than
114.

Id.§A.

115. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(E) (2001).
116. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(D) (2001).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (2001).
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(D) (2001). This definition section was added by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in its amendments to House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 241, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2001).
119. Under the "last antecedent rule" of statutory construction, qualifying words are to be applied only to
the "immediately preceding" text. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 569 (Cal.
1999) (interpreting anti-SLAPP statute).
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.2 (2001).
121. Battershell v. City of Albuquerque, 108 N.M. 658, 662, 777 P.2d 386, 390 (Ct. App. 1989).
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"quasi-judicial," are nevertheless covered--particularly because of the paradox of
otherwise protecting citizens' participation in some but not other land-use
proceedings that rely even more on broad citizen input.
The "in connection with" text of the statute protects citizen activity outside of
public hearings or public meetings. As to what conduct is "in connection with"
covered proceedings, analogous California case law supports an expansive
interpretation. Thus, letters to the editor, communications among opposing citizens,
or other conduct that in some way relates to either ongoing, past, or prospective
land-use proceedings would be treated as occurring "in connection with" such
expressly covered proceedings.' 22 Significantly, even if conduct targeted by a
SLAPP suit falls outside the statutory coverage, the complaint must still be
dismissed if the challenged conduct is protected by the First Amendment.'23 Under
preexisting case law, the First Amendment provides a constitutional defense to such
lawsuits-but without the benefit of the specific mandates of the anti-SLAPP
statute for expedited process at all levels, and without its mandatory award of legal
fees to targets prevailing on their special motions to dismiss. 24
2. Limits on Defamation Claims
The statutory savings clause for defamation actions 125 must be read in
conjunction with case law that sharply limits defamation claims arising from landuse controversies due to broad First Amendment protections. Under established
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, a developer suing for defamation may have the
burden of proving, by "clear and convincing evidence," that the target "made the
truth.' ' 26
statements with knowledge of falsity or with a reckless disregard of the
This heavy burden applies to all defamation claims by "public figures," who must
demonstrate "actual malice" beyond the falsity requirements of ordinary defamation
law.' 27 Significantly, a developer's status as a "public figure" for this limited
purpose has been held to flow from media publicity mirroring public concern over
the land-use controversy, the developer's own participation in public proceedings,
or even the developer's implicit invitation or "consent" to public comment during
such proceedings.' 28 Indeed, communications or statements by citizens made

122. See Briggs, 969 P.2d at 569-72 (entailing statements in anticipation of proceedings); Dixon v.Superior
Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 694-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (entailing letter-writing campaign during ongoing
proceedings); Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830,834-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (entailing citizens'
communications prior to complaint seeking official investigation).
123. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(E) (2001); see also cases and discussion supra notes 46-50.
124. However, courts have inherent powers to award attorney fees "for expenses incurred as a result of
frivolous or vexatious litigation." DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 124 N.M. 512, 524, 953 P.2d 277, 289
(1997). For example, after dismissing a SLAPP countersuit by a Taos developer, Judge James Hall of the Santa Fe
County District Court ordered payment of attorney fees of several SLAPP targets. Holzka, supra note 57.
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(E) (2001).
126. See Schwartz v. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, 215 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 2000) and
DeVaney, 124 N.M. at 526-27,953 P.2d at 291-92 for pertinent criteria and doctrines of New Mexico defamation
law subject to the First Amendment.
127. Id.
128. See DeVaney, 124 N.M. at 526-27,953 P.2d at 291-92 (regarding media publicity); Walters v. Unhof,
559 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Colo. 1983) (finding that developers thrust themselves into public controversy through
participation in proceeding).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

directly in land-use proceedings, as opposed to conduct merely "in connection"
29
therewith, may enjoy absolute immunity from suit regardless of malice. 1
3. Preservation of Malicious Abuse of Process Actions
By contrast, the express savings clause for other claims 131 may benefit SLAPP
targets by validating their pursuit of further relief. As articulated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court's DeVaney decision, which merged the pre-existing separate
torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process into one hybrid cause of action,
a SLAPP target need no longer await dismissal or final favorable termination of the
SLAPP suit before filing a countersuit against the SLAPPer.13' Also, the SLAPP
victim may sue for further redress, in addition to recovery of the statutory attorney
32
fees, for any emotional distress or other injury caused by the SLAPP action.
Indeed, as authorized by DeVaney, a SLAPP target may even file a malicious abuse
of process case against the SLAPPer as a counterclaim, on the face of the pleadings,
and recover damages upon "clear and convincing proof" that the SLAPP action was
brought without probable cause and for a plainly improper purpose-such as the
33
intimidation of citizens for exercising their First Amendment petitioning rights.
4. Federal Court Litigation
Although the New Mexico statute does not address its application beyond state
court litigation, the analogous California anti-SLAPP statute has been held
134
applicable also to cases in the federal courts involving diversity jurisdiction.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the state's statutory process was equally apt for
federal court litigation because it would provoke no "direct collision" with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 35 In the same way, the New Mexico anti-SLAPP
law should also control the process in federal court litigation, under diversity or
statutory civil rights jurisdiction or otherwise, particularly since its process
effectuates the United States Constitution's protections enshrined in the First
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Beyond preserving the constitutional protections for citizens exercising their
rights to petition their government, New Mexico's anti-SLAPP law of 2001
129. Dixon, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696 (discussing statute that expressly invites public comment).
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(E) (2001).
131. Fordiscussion of such "SLAPP-back" litigation, see PRING &CANAN, supra note7, at 168-87. Notably,
a SLAPP target's insurance coverage for legal or other costs cannot reduce the SLAPPer's liability, because the
"collateral source" doctrine prevents a wrongdoer from offsetting such insurance benefits against those who have
paid their own premiums. See Yardman v. San Juan Downs, Inc., 120 N.M. 751,762,906 P.2d 742,753 (Ct. App.
1995); Jojola v. Baldridge Lumber Co., 96 N.M. 761, 765, 635 P.2d 316, 320 (Ct. App. 1981).
132. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(E) (2001).
133. However, public entities that have been sued may not retaliate with malicious abuse of process actions
against citizens. City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 645 P.2d 137, 141 (Cal. 1982)(holding that, to prevent chilling
effect of lawsuits against citizens by public bodies, First Amendment right to petition bars municipality from
maintaining malicious prosecution action against individual who unsuccessfully sued the city), vacated by 459 U.S.
1095 (1983), remanded to 661 P.2d 1072 (Cal. 1983) (judgment upheld).
134. United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
135. Id. at 972-73.
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transforms the legal terrain for resolving land-use disputes throughout the state.
Most importantly, the statute mandates that the bench and bar spot and stop SLAPP
suits camouflaged as ordinary business litigation. By awarding legal fees to
prevailing SLAPP victims, thus attracting lawyers to take their cases without asking
for money upfront, the anti-SLAPP law raises the risk and removes the financial
incentive for filing SLAPP actions in the first place. The legislature's message to
judges and lawyers, therefore, is that the era of intimidation by SLAPP suits in New
Mexico is over.
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Appendix A
(ORIGINAL VERSION OF) HOUSE BILL 241
45th LEGISLATURE - STATE OF NEW MEXICO - FIRST SESSION, 2001
AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; ESTABLISHING IMMUNITY FROM
LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT IN FURTHERANCE OF A PERSON'S RIGHTS TO
PETITION THE GOVERNMENT AND FREE SPEECH IN CONNECTION WITH
A PUBLIC ISSUE; ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES; PROVIDING FOR
DAMAGES; ENACTING SECTION OF THE NMSA 1978.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO:
Section 1.FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. -The legislature finds that civil lawsuits
often claiming millions of dollars have been filed against persons for exercising
their right to free speech and to petition the government and to seek relief from,
influence action by, inform or otherwise participate in the processes of government;
these lawsuits are an abuse of the legal process because they chill and punish
participation in public affairs and the institutions of democratic government. The
legislature declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued public
participation in matters of public significance and to restore balance between the
right of access to courts and the rights of citizens to petition, speak out, associate
and otherwise participate in the political process without fear of litigation.
Section 2. SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS UNWARRANTED OR SPECIOUS
LAWSUITS-PROCEDURES-DAMAGES-SEVERABILITYA. In an action claiming economic damages arising from conduct or speech that
has as its primary purpose informing, communicating with, influencing or otherwise
participating in the process of government, a defendant in that action is immune
from liability for that conduct, except upon clear and convincing evidence that there
was no objectively reasonable basis for the conduct or activity and the conduct or
activity was undertaken in bad faith.
B. An action described in Subsection A of this section is subject to a special
motion to dismiss that shall be considered by the trial court on an expedited basis.
The responding party to the special motion to dismiss shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence and of persuasion on the motion. Discovery shall be
suspended pending decision on the motion and any appeal from a decision on the
motion. The court shall grant the special motion to dismiss and dismiss the claim
unless the responding party produces clear and convincing evidence that the alleged
acts of the moving party are not immunized from liability pursuant to Subsection
A of this section.
C. A governmental entity to which the party that is moving to dismiss has
directed its actions, or the attorney general, may intervene to defend or otherwise
support the moving party.
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D. The court shall award litigation costs to the prevailing party on the special
motion to dismiss, including reasonable attorney fees and expert witness' fees,
incurred in connection with the motion.
E. If the court grants the special motion to dismiss and the moving party
demonstrates that the respondent to the motion to dismiss brought the action
described in Subsection A of this section for the purpose of harassment, to inhibit
the moving party's public participation, to interfere with the moving party's
exercise of protected constitutional rights or otherwise injure the moving party and
shall impose such additional sanction, including disciplinary referrals, upon the
party responding to the motion to dismiss and the party's attorneys or law firm as
the court deems sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct
by others similarly situated.
F. The moving party shall have the right to an expedited interlocutory appeal
from a trial court order denying the special motion to dismiss or from a trial court's
failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.
G. Nothing in this section limits a right or remedy of a party granted pursuant to
another constitutional, statutory, common law or administrative provision.
H. If any provision of this section or the application of any provision of this
section to a person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of this section that can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are
severable.

